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INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2010, Microsoft reported a new “zero-day”
vulnerability1 in Windows XP that allowed malicious software to be
executed from USB drives.2 Two months later, it was discovered that a
sophisticated computer worm called “Stuxnet” had taken advantage of this
vulnerability to infect industrial control systems within Iran’s nuclear
facilities.3 Security researchers posited that Stuxnet was “created by a
government and [wa]s a prime example of clandestine digital warfare.”4
Although Stuxnet initially targeted specific Iranian nuclear facilities, its
widespread infection left it “splattered on thousands of computer systems
around the world,”5 including Chevron’s network.6 Nearly two years after
1. A zero-day is a security hole that the software developer is unaware of and
has not had an opportunity to patch. See L EYLA B ILGE & T UDOR D UMITRAS , B EFORE
WE K NEW I T : A N E MPIRICAL S TUDY OF Z ERO-D AY A TTACKS IN THE R EAL WORLD 1
(2012), available at http://users.ece.cmu.edu/~tdumitra/public_documents
/bilge12_zero_day.pdf (explaining that there is practically no defense against such an
attack); ADAM KLIARSKY, SANS INST., RESPONDING TO ZERO DAY THREATS 2–3 (2011),
available at http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/incident/responding
-zero-day-threats_33709 (describing how zero-day threats have allowed hackers to take
advantage of the vulnerabilities caused by organizations developing and employing new
technologies and stating that the term zero-day refers to “the amount of time the community
has to respond to a newly discovered and/or disclosed threat”). Zero-day exploits are now
frequently sold to the highest bidder by the third parties who identify them, and, as a result,
are being used to facilitate attacks rather than improve overall security. See Bruce Schneier,
The Vulnerabilities Market and the Future of Security, FORBES (May 30, 2012, 12:43 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/bruce
schneier/2012/05/30/the-vulnerabilities-market-and-the-future-of-security (concluding that the
lucrative nature of selling zero-day exploits combined with the vulnerabilities remaining
“secret and unpatched” attracts hackers to this path).
2. Gregg Keizer, Microsoft Confirms ‘Nasty’ Windows Zero-Day Bug, REUTERS (July
17, 2010, 8:37 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/07/18/urnidgns852573c4
00693880002577630070b-idUS57900582720100718.
3. See David E. Sanger, Iran Fights Malware Attacking Computers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
26, 2010, at 4, 14 (indicating that “[a] worm is a self-replicating malware computer
program”); Riva Richmond, Malware Hits Computerized Industrial Equipment, N.Y. TIMES
BITS BLOG (Sept. 24, 2010, 8:41 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/24/malware
-hits-computerized-industrial-equipment (stating that Stuxnet was discovered by a
Belarussian computer security firm).
4. John Markoff, A Silent Attack, but Not a Subtle One, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2010, at A6.
5. Id.
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Stuxnet was discovered, a New York Times exposé revealed that the
United States and Israel had developed the worm as part of a project
codenamed “Olympic Games.”7 This news clearly signaled the shift in
cyberoperations from rogue groups to the nation-state level.8
Representatives from the United States and other nations have begun
discussing frameworks for analyzing cyberoperations under international
law.9 However, discussions of the constitutional limitations and the civil
liberties implications of military cyberoperations have been limited.10
Many recent articles have attempted to provide answers to how traditional
legal principles governing military action will apply in cyberspace;11 this
Article is another along that vein.
6. Rachael King, Virus Aimed at Iran Infected Chevron’s Network, WALL ST. J., Nov.
9, 2012, at B1.
7. See David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran,
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2012, at A1 (describing President Obama’s adoption of the Bush-era
“Olympic Games” program and his decision to accelerate the Stuxnet attack on Iran).
8. See Misha Glenny, Op-Ed., A Weapon We Can’t Control, N.Y. TIMES, June 25,
2012, at A19 (calling the joint effort by Israel and the United States to develop and deploy
the Stuxnet worm a “significant and dangerous turning point in the gradual militarization of
the Internet”).
9. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks at the
USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference: International Law in Cyberspace (Sept. 18,
2012), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm (addressing the
Obama Administration’s views on how international law applies in cyberspace and applying
customary international law to argue for the right of national self-defense and
proportionality in addressing cyberattacks); see also Michael N. Schmitt, International Law
in Cyberspace: The Koh Speech and Tallinn Manual Juxtaposed, 54 HARV. INT’L. L.J.
ONLINE 13 (2012) (discussing the differences between the U.S. views expressed by
Professor Koh and those adopted by the International Group of Experts convened by the
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD COE)). The Tallinn
Manual is the result of a long-term cooperative effort by NATO to provide legal clarity in
this area. INT’L GRP. OF EXPERTS, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 1, 3–4 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter
TALLINN MANUAL].
10. The domestic legal implications of cyber “counterstriking” were addressed in a
recent article. Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: Self-Defense
and Deterrence in Cyberspace, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 488–510 (2012). A few other
articles have briefly addressed civil liberties issues in this context. See, e.g., Sean M.
Condron, Getting It Right: Protecting American Critical Infrastructure in Cyberspace, 20
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 403, 416 (2007) (“The law must . . . adjust traditional understandings of
the right to privacy, the right to protection against an unreasonable search, and the right to
due process, given the practical necessity of responding to cyberattacks before determining
the attacker’s identity and intent.” (footnotes omitted)); Stephen Dycus, Congress’s Role in
Cyber Warfare, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 155, 158 (2010) (advocating for additional
congressional checks on the President’s war powers as applied in cyberspace); John N.
Greer, Square Legal Pegs in Round Cyber Holes: The NSA, Lawfulness, and the Protection
of Privacy Rights and Civil Liberties in Cyberspace, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 139, 143
(2010) (noting that “NSA lawyers need to be sure that the agency’s IA [Information
Assurance] computer monitoring operations are conducted in strict conformity with the . . .
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution”).
11. See, e.g., Michael Gervais, Cyber Attacks and the Laws of War, 30 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 525, 526 (2012) (referring to cyberspace as a “new battleground for warfare”
governed by unsettled laws but pointing to existing international instruments that govern the
laws of war for guidance).
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This Article takes a novel approach to cybersecurity policy by considering
the implications of the Third Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.12 While
the Third Amendment’s anti-quartering provision has been historically
overlooked—in over two hundred years, very few federal cases have
reviewed the provision at length13—it is the subject of a growing body of
academic literature.14 The Supreme Court has recognized that the Third
12. “No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent
of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.” U.S. CONST.
amend. III.
13. See Custer Cnty. Action Ass’n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024, 1042–44 (10th Cir. 2001)
(stating that “[j]udicial interpretation of the Third Amendment is nearly nonexistent” and
rejecting as “border[ing] on frivolous” the petitioners’ claim that military flights over their
land constituted military occupation without consent in violation of the Third Amendment);
Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 961–64 (2d. Cir. 1982) (noting “[t]he absence of any case
law directly construing” the Third Amendment and holding that correctional officers had a
Third Amendment right to exclude National Guardsmen from the officers’ state-owned
housing).
14. See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, “Property” in the Constitution: The View from the Third
Amendment, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1243, 1245–46 (2012) [hereinafter Bell,
“Property” in the Constitution] (contemplating the varying meanings of “property” in the
Constitution and invoking the Third Amendment to argue that personal and real property
merit the same protection under the Takings Clause); Tom W. Bell, The Third Amendment:
Forgotten but Not Gone, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 117, 117 (1993) [hereinafter Bell,
Forgotten but Not Gone] (seeking to “fill the most glaring . . . gaps in Third Amendment
scholarship”); William S. Fields & David T. Hardy, The Third Amendment and the Issue of
the Maintenance of Standing Armies: A Legal History, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 393, 430
(1991) (“The third amendment, then, served as a broadly accepted basic right upon which a
structure of newer, more enigmatic and controversial rights could ultimately be built.”);
Robert A. Gross, Public and Private in the Third Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 215, 220
(1991) (defining the historical significance of the Third Amendment as “carv[ing] out a
sharp distinction between public and private that is the hallmark of the modern capitalist,
middle-class, social order”); Morton J. Horwitz, Is the Third Amendment Obsolete?, 26
VAL. U. L. REV. 209, 212 (1991) (pointing out “important struggles over the scope of the
Third Amendment”); Andrew P. Morriss & Richard L. Stroup, Quartering Species: The
“Living Constitution,” the Third Amendment, and the Endangered Species Act, 30 ENVTL.
L. 769, 770–71 (2000) (analogizing the Endangered Species Act to the quartering provision
of the Third Amendment); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63
STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1028–33 (2011) (exploring the “object” of the Third Amendment and
the role it plays in the Bill of Rights); Robert A. Rutland, The Trivialization of the Bill of
Rights: One Historian’s View of How the Purposes of the First Ten Amendments Have
Been Defiled, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 287, 293–94 (1990) (calling for “an end to the
trivialization of the Bill of Rights”); Christopher J. Schmidt, Could a CIA or FBI Agent Be
Quartered in Your House During a War on Terrorism, Iraq or North Korea?, 48 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 587, 590 (2004) (examining the text of the Third Amendment to resolve the
possibility of compelled quartering of CIA and FBI agents in connection with the U.S. fight
against terrorism); Geoffrey M. Wyatt, The Third Amendment in the Twenty-First Century:
Military Recruiting on Private Campuses, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 113, 113–14, 123 (2005)
(proposing the Third Amendment as the foundation for a successful attack against laws that
require private universities to allow military recruiters on their campuses); Josh Dugan,
Note, When Is a Search Not a Search? When It’s a Quarter: The Third Amendment,
Originalism, and NSA Wiretapping, 97 GEO. L.J. 555, 558 (2009) (calling for a modern and
broader application of the Third Amendment by arguing that “the Founders used the word
‘quartering’ to expansively refer to a practical and substantial intrusion that threatened the
legitimacy of government and the rule of law”); James P. Rogers, Note, Third Amendment
Protections in Domestic Disasters, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 747, 750 (2008)
(considering the “possibility that Third Amendment violations occurred in Louisiana or
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Amendment creates a “zone of privacy” similar to those in the First and
Fourth Amendments.15 This zone of privacy protects individuals from
military intrusions absent consent or special wartime legislative mandate.16
Given the potential of military cyberoperations to intrude upon innocent
domestic systems, as demonstrated by the Stuxnet example, the Third
Amendment’s constitutional prohibitions must be taken into account. This
Article is intended to supplement existing discussions of cybersecurity
policy while considering the principles of the Third Amendment in this
new context. Because the history and purpose of the Third Amendment is
discussed at length in other literature,17 it will be summarized only briefly
in this Article.
Part I discusses in detail recent cyberoperations and cyberstrategies that
affect civilian networks and hardware. Part II addresses the structure and
history of the Third Amendment and its relevance to the division between
military and civilian realms. And Part III analyzes the effect of military
cyberoperations on civilian devices—such as a server, network router, or
personal computer—under the Third Amendment. Finally, Part IV
discusses the implications of the Third Amendment’s consent and wartime
proscription requirements on the current cybersecurity policy debate.
This Article concludes that there are strict constitutional limitations to
the cyberspace actions that the President can authorize, including in the
recently-proposed cybersecurity Executive Order.18 The President cannot
authorize military actions in cyberspace that affect private domestic
systems without the safeguards of congressional approval or a publicprivate partnership. These safeguards require increased public engagement
in and knowledge of the decisionmaking process related to
cyberoperations.19
Mississippi in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina”); Thomas G. Sprankling, Note, Does
Five Equal Three? Reading the Takings Clause in Light of the Third Amendment’s
Protection of Houses, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 112, 114 (2012) (arguing that “the Third
Amendment provides a constitutional basis for distinguishing between homes and the other
types of ‘private property’ covered by the Takings Clause”).
15. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (explaining that various
guarantees create a zone of privacy, including the right of association in the First
Amendment, the prohibition against quartering “Soldier[s]” in the Third Amendment, and
the right to be free from unreasonable searches in the Fourth Amendment).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
17. For a review of the seventeenth century British common law on quartering, see Bell,
Forgotten but Not Gone, supra note 14, at 118–24; Fields & Hardy, supra note 14, at 395–413;
and Wyatt, supra note 14, at 125–29. For an in-depth discussion of the meaning at the time the
Constitution was ratified, see Dugan, supra note 14, at 574–81.
18. Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,737 (Feb. 19, 2013).
19. See, e.g., David E. Sanger & Thom Shanker, Broad Powers Seen for Obama in
Cyberstrikes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2013, at A1 (describing a “secret legal review,” conducted
to assess President Obama’s powers in relation to U.S. use of cyberweapons, which declared
that President Obama “has the broad power to order a pre-emptive strike” if a threat is
detected).
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THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER NATIONS NOW HAVE AN ACTIVE
MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN CYBERSPACE

The United States is now actively engaged in military cyberoperations.
The Secretary of Defense directed the U.S. Strategic Command to establish
the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) on June 23, 2009.20 This
command center, located in Fort Meade, Maryland, became fully
operational in October 2010.21 USCYBERCOM is now focused on
building additional capabilities for its “cyber warrior[s].”22 This is
necessary because, according to the Department of Defense’s (DoD) most
recent assessment, “cyber attacks will be a significant component of any
future conflict.”23 Thus the DoD’s strategy requires “[t]reating cyberspace
as an operational domain like land, air, sea and space, operating and
defending department networks and training and equipping forces for cyber
missions.”24
In his remarks on cybersecurity in the fall of 2012, Secretary of Defense
Leon Panetta acknowledged that the DoD has the capability to conduct
operations in response to cyberspace threats.25 These efforts are certainly
focused on combating the threat of what Secretary Panetta and others have
described as “a cyber Pearl Harbor; an attack that would cause physical
destruction and the loss of life.”26 However, the recent discovery of statesponsored cyberattacks targeting Iran indicates that the United States is
already involved in cyberoperations that stretch beyond its defensive
boundary.27 Given that these cyberoperations have already infected civilian
20. U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets
/cyber_command (last updated Dec. 2011).
21. Id. The mission of USCYBERCOM is as follows:
USCYBERCOM is responsible for planning, coordinating, integrating,
synchronizing, and directing activities to operate and defend the Department of
Defense information networks and, when directed, conducts full-spectrum military
cyberspace operations (in accordance with all applicable laws and regulations) in
order to ensure U.S. and allied freedom of action in cyberspace, while denying the
same to our adversaries.
Id.
22. Donna Miles, Cyber Command Builds ‘Cyber Warrior’ Capabilities, U.S. DEP’T
DEF. (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=65459.
23. Cheryl Pellerin, DOD Releases First Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, U.S.
DEP’T DEF. (July 14, 2011), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=64686.
24. Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBERSPACE POLICY
REPORT: A REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011, SECTION 934, at 1 (2011), available at http://www.defense.gov
/home/features/2011/0411_cyberstrategy/docs/NDAA%20Section%20934%20Report
_For%20webpage.pdf (detailing the DoD’s strategic initiatives relating to cyberspace).
25. Leon Panetta, U.S. Sec’y of Def., Remarks on Cybersecurity to the Business
Executives for National Security (Oct. 11, 2012), available at http://www.defense.gov
/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5136.
26. Id.
27. See infra Part I.A–B (describing the Stuxnet and Flame cyberattacks and suggesting
that the United States participated).
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infrastructure,28 it is worth exploring the constitutional implications of the
impact of military cyberoperations on civilian computers and networks.
Computer security researchers have recently uncovered several new
cyberattacks and cyberoperations. Some of these attacks involve malware
designed to alter the functions of industrial control systems that can cause
physical damage.29 Other attacks involve the use of sophisticated
cyberespionage tools that can be controlled and deployed remotely.30 Still
other operations involve “hacking back” in response to an external
cyberattack.31 All of these cyberoperations have the potential to intrude
upon and affect private civilian networks, which would implicate the Third
Amendment.
A. Cyberattacks Targeted at Critical Infrastructure Typically Require
Aggressive Self-Replication of a Computer Virus or Worm, Which Can
Lead to Collateral Infection
At the time Stuxnet was discovered in mid-2010, it was one of the “most
complex threats . . . [ever] analyzed.”32 Stuxnet is an example of a
cyberattack that targets an industrial control system (ICS) used to manage
critical infrastructure.33 Such an attack requires multiple phases, exploits,34
and infection vectors35 in order to circumvent both physical and digital
28. See King, supra note 6 (reporting that Stuxnet infiltrated American corporations’ IT
systems, including that of Chevron). Viruses and worms are two types of malware that can
typically self-replicate, causing widespread infection. What Is the Difference: Viruses,
Worms, Trojans, and Bots?, CISCO, http://www.cisco.com/web/
about/security/intelligence/virus-worm-diffs.html (last visited June 15, 2013).
29. See Incident Response Activity, ICS-CERT MONITOR (Indus. Control Sys., Cyber
Emergency Response Team, Wash., D.C.), Oct.–Dec. 2012, at 1–2, available at http://icscert.us-cert.gov/pdf/ICS-CERT_Monthly_Monitor_Oct-Dec2012.pdf (describing that an
infected USB drive spread malware to approximately ten computers owned by a power
plant, delaying plant operations for approximately three weeks).
30. See Lee Ferran et al., Flame Cyber Attack: Israel Behind Largest Cyber Spy
Weapon Ever?, ABC NEWS (May 29, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/flame-cyberattack-israel-largest-cyber-spy-weapon/story?id=16449339 (explaining that Flame could
receive remote commands to take screenshots, record audio and keystrokes, and perform
other “sophisticated capabilities”).
31. See Hannah Lobel, Note, Cyber War Inc.: The Law of War Implications of the
Private Sector’s Role in Cyber Conflict, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 617, 633 (2012) (“[A]ctive
defenses can go beyond simply warding off an attack with passive security measures like
firewalls and instead involve actively attacking the attacker.”).
32. NICOLAS FALLIERE ET AL., SYMANTEC, W32.STUXNET DOSSIER 1 (2011), available
at http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/
whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf.
33. See Sanger, supra note 7 (describing that, specifically, the Stuxnet virus was used to
target Iran’s Natanz nuclear plant and it managed to disable “nearly 1,000 of the 5,000
centrifuges Iran had spinning at the time to purify uranium”).
34. See JOHN ROLLINS & CLAY WILSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33123, TERRORIST
CAPABILITIES FOR CYBERATTACK: OVERVIEW AND POLICY ISSUES 18 (2007), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33123.pdf (defining zero-day exploits as “unknown
computer vulnerabilities,” which can be sold by hackers).
35. An infection vector is a general term for the method used to place a virus on a
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security measures.36 In the case of Stuxnet, the self-executing virus was so
aggressive in propagating itself that, by September 2010, it had infected
more than 100,000 hosts, including thousands in the United States.37
The term ICS describes a broad range of systems used to control
everything from power plants to gas pipelines.38 These include supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, distributed control systems
(DCS), and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC).39 The SCADA
systems are necessary to control geographically dispersed equipment using
centralized data, such as electrical grids or gas pipelines.40 The DCS
operates on a more localized scale, and the PLCs are the “computer-based
solid-state devices” that ultimately control the industrial equipment.41
Another critical component of any ICS is the Human-Machine Interface
(HMI), which allows human operators to monitor and control the system
configurations.42
The ultimate goal of a targeted ICS attack like Stuxnet is to “reprogram
industrial control systems (ICS) by modifying code on programmable logic
controllers (PLCs) to make them work in a manner the attacker intended
and to hide those changes from the operator of the equipment.”43 The
result would be to sabotage a high-value target by controlling specific
industrial machines.44 Achieving this goal would require intimate
knowledge of the target network and ICS to configure the software; the
infection of the target network by a third party; the spread and control of
the virus throughout the network; and a self-executing function enabled by
the virus when it reaches its final destination (disconnected from any
command server).45
The first phase of such an operation requires extensive industrial
system. See generally Paul Schmehl, Malware Infection Vectors: Past, Present, and
Future, http://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/malware-infection-vectors-past-presentand-future (last updated Nov. 2, 2010) (detailing the history of modern computer viruses by
focusing on how they are spread).
36. For example, the ICS targeted by Stuxnet would likely not have had direct Internet
access, so the virus would have to be transported from the broader industrial network onto a
specific computer used to control the ICS. FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 32, at 3.
37. Id. at 5 & fig.1.
38. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, SPEC. PUB. NO.
800-82, GUIDE TO INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS (ICS) SECURITY 1-1 (2011), available at
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-82/SP800-82-final.pdf.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2-1.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2-4.
43. FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 32, at 1. For more information on ICS, see generally
Brendan Galloway & Gerhard P. Hancke, Introduction to Industrial Control Networks,
IEEE: COMM. SURVS. & TUTORIALS 1 (2012).
44. FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 32, at 3 (indicating that the final goal of Stuxnet was
sabotaging ICSs).
45. See id. (explaining the likely “attack scenario” for Stuxnet).
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espionage, which is a common component of many cyberattacks.46 The
second and third phases, however, require rapid and aggressive expansion
of the virus within a network, which can lead to widespread infection.47
This can create a problem because “[o]nce self-replicating code is released,
it’s difficult to exercise complete control over where it goes, what it does,
and how far it spreads”; in addition, once the public becomes aware of the
virus, people are better able to protect themselves, and the virus’s
usefulness “in terms of payload delivery” is diminished.48
Stuxnet was capable of spreading so rapidly in part because it made use
of a group of zero-day exploits within Microsoft Windows that allowed it
to spread across the network using peer-to-peer connections, databases, and
shared network drives.49 It also used a key zero-day exploit, the “LNK
Vulnerability,” to copy itself to remote USB drives inserted into infected
computers.50 Stuxnet then infected other computers with those drives—
eventually deleting itself and covering up the traces.51 Stuxnet was also
designed to connect to a remote server after infection; upload information
about the infected system; and download any available patches, updates, or
new instructions.52
Cyberattacks, like Stuxnet, used to target ICS are incredibly complex
and include a variety of functions to inject themselves into critical systems.
The same functions that can serve to spread the necessary viruses to ICS
modules and target PLCs can also cause the viruses to become widely
distributed over broader networks.53 As a result, cyberattacks targeting
industrial systems can become widespread on civilian networks.54
B. Other Offensive Cyberoperations Spread Throughout Targeted
Networks To Gather Sensitive Information
Offensive cyberoperations include “actions taken against an adversary’s
46. See infra Part I.B (discussing the recently-discovered Red October and Flame
malware packages).
47. See ALEKSANDR MATROSOV ET AL., ESET, STUXNET UNDER THE MICROSCOPE 10
(2011), available at http://go.eset.com/us/resources/white-papers/Stuxnet_Under_
the_Microscope.pdf (describing the propagation of malware as “promiscuous”).
48. Id.
49. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 32, at 25–28 (describing the various ways that
Stuxnet propagated).
50. Id. at 29–30.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 21–23.
53. Galloway & Hancke, supra note 43, at 16.
54. Many scholars warn of attacks that have the secondary effect of attacking private
sector networks. See, e.g., Erik M. Mudrinich, Cyber 3.0: The Department of Defense
Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace and the Attribution Problem, 68 A.F. L. REV. 167,
170–71 (2012) (describing how an attack on DoD domains could jump to civilian networks
because DoD networks are “largely reliant” on outside networks that “include national
critical infrastructure”).
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computer systems or networks that harm the adversary’s interests.”55 Many
military cyberoperations are not intended to cause physical destruction.56
For example, cyberexploitations are used to facilitate quiet and
undetectable information-gathering.57 These operations take advantage of
the same vulnerabilities and access paths as targeted cyberattacks.58 The
viruses used in cyberexploits can infect computers and systems across the
globe, and these viruses can remain dormant for years without detection.59
Recently uncovered cyberexploitation attacks used sophisticated malware
to gather troves of confidential data from a broad range of computers and
devices.60
In May 2012, security firms uncovered a large and complex malware set
referred to as “Flame,” “Flamer,” or “sKyWIper.”61 This program enables
such a broad range of espionage functions that it has been referred to as the
“Swiss-Army knife of cyberspying.”62 Security researchers eventually
linked Flame with Stuxnet and other recently discovered programs through
common code functions and the “Command and Control” (C&C) servers
used to remotely configure and direct the attacks.63 The same officials who
55. Herbert Lin, Escalation Dynamics and Conflict Termination in Cyberspace, STRATEGIC
STUD. Q., Fall 2012, at 46, 46, available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2012/fall/lin.pdf.
56. See id. at 48 (explaining that the intent of the cyberintruder varies).
57. Id. at 48–49. As Dr. Lin describes, “Cyber exploitation is the use of deliberate ITrelated actions—perhaps over an extended period of time—to support the goals and
missions of the party conducting the exploitation, usually for the purpose of obtaining
information resident on or transiting through an adversary’s computer system or network.”
Id. at 48. These cyberexploitations are different than cyberattacks because the goal is to
remain undetected and not to disrupt normal functions or user experiences. Id.; see also
COMM. ON OFFENSIVE INFO. WARFARE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS.,
TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF
CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 12 box 1.1 (William A. Owens et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter
NRC REPORT] (listing the difference between cyberattacks and cyberexploits).
58. Lin, supra note 55, at 48.
59. See Next-Generation Threats, FIREEYE, http://www.fireeye.com/threat-protection
(last visited June 15, 2013) (proposing that “advanced malware” is usually successful
because “few technologies monitor outbound malware transmissions”).
60. NRC REPORT, supra note 57, at 85.
61. See LAB. OF CRYPTOGRAPHY & SYS. SEC., BUDAPEST UNIV. OF TECH. & ECON.,
SKYWIPER (A.K.A. FLAME A.K.A. FLAMER): A COMPLEX MALWARE FOR TARGETED ATTACKS 2
(2012) [hereinafter SKYWIPER], available at http://www.crysys.hu/skywiper/skywiper.pdf
(investigating a then-unknown malware and revealing that the malware impacted several
countries); Identification of a New Targeted Cyber-Attack, IRAN NAT’L COMPUTER
EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM COORDINATION CTR. (May 28, 2012), http://www.certcc.ir
/index.php?name=news&file=article&sid=1894 (announcing the detection of Flame and
development of removal tools).
62. Andy Greenberg, To Spy on Offline Computers, Flame Malware Was Designed To
Turn Humans into ‘Data Mules,’ FORBES (June 12, 2012, 9:30 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/06/12/to-spy-on-offline-computers
-flame-malware-was-designed-to-turn-humans-into-data-mules.
63. Resource 207: Kaspersky Lab Research Proves that Stuxnet and Flame Developers
Are Connected, KASPERSKY LAB (June 11, 2012), http://www.kaspersky.com/about/news/virus
/2012/Resource_207_Kaspersky_Lab_Research_Proves_that_Stuxnet_and_Flame_Develop
ers_are_Connected (acknowledging the existence of evidence demonstrating that the same

BUTLER.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

7/3/2013 10:51 AM

WHEN CYBERWEAPONS END UP ON PRIVATE NETWORKS

1213

acknowledged U.S. involvement in the Stuxnet attack declined to confirm
whether the United States was also the source of Flame.64 Attribution of a
cyberattack, especially a clandestine exploitation focused on espionage, is
very difficult due to the limited information available.65
Regardless of the source of these attacks, Flame and other related
programs66 reveal the capacities to capture credentials, communications,
audio, video, and a wide range of other sensitive data from a broad range of
devices and networks.67 The attack vector used by Flame is especially
troubling because it relies upon a vulnerability in the digital certificates that
everyday computers depended on to guarantee secure updates for Microsoft
Windows.68 The Flame toolkit is relatively large compared to other
malware, which allows it to be incredibly versatile and gives the remote

team that developed Stuxnet also designed Flame); see Kim Zetter, Researchers Connect
Flame to US-Israel Stuxnet Attack, WIRED: THREAT LEVEL (June 11, 2012, 9:30 AM),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/06/flame-tied-to-stuxnet (reporting the “discover[y]
that a part of the module that allows Flame to spread via USB sticks using the autorun
function on a Windows machine contains the same code that was used in a version of
Stuxnet”); New Investigation Points to Three New Flame-related Malicious Programs: At
Least
One
Still
in
the
Wild,
KASPERSKY LAB (Sept.
17,
2012),
http://www.kaspersky.com/about/news/virus/2012/New_investigation_points_to
_three_new_Flame_related_malicious_programs_at_least_one_still_in_the_wild (unveiling the
results of a follow-up study that revealed that the development of Flame began as early as 2006).
64. Sanger, supra note 7.
65. See Lin, supra note 55, at 49–50 (describing the difficulties associated with both
“technical” and “all source” attribution, including lack of forensic clues, unknown
motivations, and the intruder’s operational security); see also David E. Sanger, Mutually
Assured Cyberdestruction?, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2012, at SR4 (ascribing the difficulty in
deterring cyberattacks to the complexity involved in discovering where attacks originated).
66. See G LOBAL R ESEARCH & A NALYSIS T EAM , K ASPERSKY L AB , G AUSS :
A BNORMAL D ISTRIBUTION 3 (2012) [hereinafter KASPERSKY , G AUSS ], available at
http://www.securelist.com/en/downloads/vlpdfs/kaspersky-lab-gauss.pdf (explaining Gauss, a
malware discovered primarily in Lebanon); Global Research & Analysis Team, Kaspersky Lab,
miniFlame aka SPE:
“Elvis and His Friends,” SECURELIST (Oct. 15, 2012),
http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792247/miniFlame_aka_SPE_Elvis_and_his_frie
nds [hereinafter Kaspersky, miniFlame] (discussing miniFlame, a smaller module connected
to the same C&C servers as Flame).
67. See Ferran et al., supra note 30 (referring to Flame as “a veritable ‘toolkit’ of cyber
spying programs”). See generally SKYWIPER, supra note 61, at 2 (characterizing sKyWIper
as “complex with a large number of components” including numerous compression and
encryption techniques).
68. Chester Wisniewski, Flame Malware Used Man-in-the-Middle Attack Against
Windows Update, NAKED SEC., SOPHOS (June 4, 2012), http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com
/2012/06/04/flame-malware-used-man-in-the-middle-attack-against-windows-update. This
vulnerability depended on the discovery of a rare “MD5 hash collision” that could be used
to sign a digital certificate. Richard Stiennon, Flame’s MD5 Collision Is the Most
Worrisome Security Discovery of 2012, FORBES (June 14, 2012, 6:45 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardstiennon/2012/06/14/flames-md5-collision-is-the-mostworrisome-security-discovery-of-2012; see Alexander Sotirov et al., MD5 Considered
Harmful Today:
Creating a Rogue CA Certificate, HASHCLASH PROJECT,
http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca (last modified June 16, 2011) (identifying a
vulnerability and providing a proof-of-concept attack that takes advantage of a weakness in
the MD5 cryptographic hash algorithm to forge digital certificates).
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operators a great deal of control over its actions.69
This modular structure and its tiered approach to infection are the
prominent features of the Flame-related cyberexploits.70 Forensic analysis
of the servers controlling Flame uncovered at least three other
cyberespionage or cybersabotage tools that the same author created and
controlled.71 These different tools are able to interact and coordinate; some
modules can relay stolen data to the C&C servers while others infect
removable drives and report back once data has been collected from remote
devices.72
It appears that the hierarchical control structure of Flame helped to
prevent the widespread infection problem that Stuxnet suffered.73 Flame
even included a “kill switch” command, which was sent within a week of
its initial discovery.74 This command from the C&C servers orders the
deletion of the majority of files and folders used by the malware.75 The
C&C servers then remove any trace that the files and folders ever existed.76
Due to this “suicide” functionality, it is impossible to know the total
number of Flame-related infections, but forensic research on the C&C
servers indicates that these programs were focused primarily on targets in
Iran, Lebanon, Sudan, and a few other countries in the Middle East.77 All
three of the Flame-related programs analyzed by the Global Research and
Analysis Team at the Kaspersky Lab included infections from IP addresses

69. See Alexander Gostev, The Flame: Questions and Answers, SECURELIST (May 28, 2012),
http://www.securelist.com/en/blog/208193522/The_Flame_Questions_and_Answers
(asserting
that “Flame is one of the most complex threats ever discovered” partially because of its
large size, complex algorithms, and scripting programming language); Neil Roiter, Flame Is
the Mother of All Spyware, but While It May Raise the Stakes, It Doesn’t Change the Game,
SEC. BISTRO (May 29, 2012), http://www.securitybistro.com/blog/?p=1605 (contrasting Flame
with other spyware such as Stuxnet and noting that although Flame has similar functionality,
it is relatively “huge and highly versatile” by comparison).
70. Gostev, supra note 69.
71. Kaspersky, miniFlame, supra note 66.
72. Id.
73. See Symantec Sec. Response, Flamer:
Urgent Suicide, SYMANTEC,
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/flamer-urgent-suicide (last updated June 6, 2012)
(explaining that the Flamer control servers sent updated commands “designed to completely
remove Flamer from the compromised computer,” thereby halting the infection from
spreading more).
74. See John Naughton, How Flame Virus Has Changed Everything for Online Security
Firms, GUARDIAN (June 16, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/jun/
17/flame-virus-online-security (questioning whether the writers of Flame would ever be
discovered because the “kill switch” had been activated to remove all traces of the
malware); Symantec Sec. Response, supra note 73 (referring to this command as the
“uninstaller”).
75. Symantec Sec. Response, supra note 73.
76. Id.
77. See Kaspersky, miniFlame, supra note 66 (distinguishing miniFlame as not having a
“geographical bias” compared to Flame, which was mostly found in Iran and Sudan, and
Gauss, which had a majority of its infections recorded in Lebanon).
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traced to the United States.78
Simple spyware has been used for more than two decades to collect and
send private data over the Internet, and more advanced cyberespionage
tools have been constantly evolving over that same period.79 However, it
appears that sophisticated C&C modules are now being deployed on a
global scale.80 In fact, in early 2013, researchers uncovered a new
campaign referred to as “Red October,” which contains intricacies in its
infrastructure that rival those found in the Flame malware.81 Red October
currently remains active and dates “as far back as May 2007.”82 It is
unclear whether this new attack is the work of a nation-state, but its victims
include government agencies, diplomats, research institutions, and major
industrial sectors.83 The Red October attack demonstrates that it is highly
unlikely that cyberspying has yet reached its peak, and there are no
indications that it will end any time soon.

78. See KASPERSKY, GAUSS, supra note 66, at 5–6 (elaborating that forty-three infected
IPs were linked to the United States but articulating Kaspersky’s belief that “in the majority
of cases linked to the USA and Germany the affected users were actually in the Middle East
too—using VPNs (or the Tor anonymity network)”); Kaspersky, miniFlame, supra note 66
(showing that the distribution of victims’ IPs infected with miniFlame includes nearly ten
from the United States); see also Global Research & Analysis Team, Kaspersky Lab, Full
Analysis of Flame’s Command & Control Servers, SECURELIST (Sept. 17, 2012, 1:00 PM),
http://www.securelist.com/en/blog/750
/Full_Analysis_of_Flame_s_Command_Control_servers (detailing that during a one-week
period, sixty-eight IPs in the United States connected to one Flame server).
79. See CTR. FOR SEC. & PRIVACY SOLUTIONS, DELOITTE, CYBER ESPIONAGE: THE
HARSH REALITY OF ADVANCED SECURITY THREATS (2011), available at
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/A
ERS/us_aers_sp_cyber_espionage_screen_friendly_100511.pdf
(describing
ongoing
cyberthreats as evolving and recommending that organizations similarly evolve to include
proactive protection and monitoring).
80. See Benjamin Cruz, Botnet Control Servers Span the Globe, MCAFEE LABS (Jan.
23, 2013, 4:17 PM), http://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/botnet-control-servers-span-theglobe (revealing that the majority of the C&C servers monitored were located in the United
States); see also Matt Vasilogambros, America’s 3 Biggest Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities,
NAT’L J. (Mar. 13, 2013, 4:00 PM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/
whitehouse/america-s-3-biggest-cybersecurity-vunerabilities-20130313
(“The
Obama
administration has put cyberattacks at the top of the list of global threats, and concerns are
rising about at-risk infrastructure.”).
81. Global Research & Analysis Team, Kaspersky Lab, The “Red October”
Campaign—An Advanced Cyber Espionage Network Targeting Diplomatic and Government
Agencies, SECURELIST (Jan. 14, 2013, 1:00 PM), http://www.securelist.com/en/blog/785
/The_Red_October_Campaign_An_Advanced_Cyber_Espionage_Network_Targeting
_Diplomatic_and_Government_Agencies.
82. Id.
83. See id. (asserting that while infections are mostly distributed in Eastern Europe,
reports are coming from Switzerland and Luxembourg, as well as North America). The
victims are classified into eight main categories: government; research/embassies; research
institutions; trade and commerce; nuclear/energy research; oil and gas companies;
aerospace; military. Id.
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C. Active Defense Countermeasures Also Include Offensive Capabilities
That Can Affect Innocent Third-Party Systems
While the United States may be engaged in certain limited
cyberoperations, the primary focus of the DoD is currently on ensuring the
safety of government networks and critical infrastructure.84 This effort is
being coordinated by the USCYBERCOM, which operates in conjunction
with the National Security Agency (NSA).85 These defense components
are still in the process of developing and implementing a comprehensive
strategy to address current cyberthreats.86
One strategy that has been discussed for more than fifteen years87 is
“active defense” and the use of cyber “counterstrikes.”88 Active defense
involves a three-step process: “(1) detecting an intrusion, (2) tracing the
intruder, and (3) some form of cyber counterstrike.”89 The primary goal of
an active defense system is deterrence.90 This can be achieved through
retribution after the fact or mitigation at the time of attack.91 Retaliatory
counterstrikes are still very controversial and many have questioned their
84. See U.S DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN
CYBERSPACE 1, 5 (2011), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf
(listing the DoD’s need to “[m]anage cyberspace risk through efforts such as increased
training,” and to “[e]nsure the development of integrated capabilities . . . to rapidly deliver
and deploy innovative capabilities” as reasons to establish USCYBERCOM).
85. See id. at 5 (indicating that the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
charged USCYBERCOM with coordinating cyberservice components within all military
cybercommands).
86. See id. at 6 (outlining the five initiatives comprising the DoD’s strategic
development for responding to cyberthreats and for operating in cyberspace); Sanger &
Shanker, supra note 19 (disclosing that in February 2013, Congress was in the process of
promulgating new, classified policies on how the United States can defend against
cyberattacks).
87. See, e.g., DOROTHY E. DENNING, INFORMATION WARFARE AND SECURITY 392–93
(1999) (identifying an in-kind response as a type of offensive strategy used to retaliate
against cyberattacks); Deborah Radcliff, Can You Hack Back?, CNN (June 1, 2000, 10:30
AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/06/01/hack.back.idg (discussing the
complexity of retaliation in cyberspace). Security researcher Dave Dittrich has compiled a
list of resources dating back to 1998 related to the “active response continuum.”
Articles/Papers/Audio Related to the Active Response Continuum, UNIV. OF WASH.,
http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/activedefense.html (last updated Jan. 8, 2013, 2:25 PM).
88. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 10, at 433.
89. Id. (citing Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical National
Infrastructure: A Use of Force Invoking the Right to Self-Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 207,
231 (2002); Bruce P. Smith, Hacking, Poaching, and Counterattacking: Digital
Counterstrikes and the Contours of Self-Help, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 171, 182 (2005)).
90. Id. at 420; see also U.S. ARMY TRAINING & DOCTRINE COMMAND, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
ARMY, THE UNITED STATES ARMY CONCEPT CAPABILITY PLAN FOR ARMY ELECTRONIC
WARFARE OPERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE MODULAR FORCE 2015–2024, at 9 (Aug. 16, 2007),
available at http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/p525-7-6.pdf (defining “deterrence” as
a maneuver to “convince adversaries not to take actions that threaten U.S. vital interests by
means of decisive influence over their decisionmaking,” which is achieved through credible
threats “to deny benefits . . . or impose costs, while encouraging restraint by convincing the
adversary that restraint will result in an acceptable outcome”).
91. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 10, at 420.
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legal basis under domestic and international law.92
The components of an active defense strategy have already been outlined
at length in a number of prominent reports and articles.93 The critical first
steps involve detecting an attack and tracing it back to its source.94
Computer security firms have already developed advanced Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) that can take the first step.95 The traceback step is
more difficult, but there have been significant recent advances in traceback
technology.96 Still, many reject the idea that cyberattacks can be accurately
attributed using current technical methods.97

92. Id. at 421; see, e.g., Susan Brenner, Offensive Economic Espionage?, 54 HARV.
INT’L L.J. ONLINE 92, 99 (2012) (articulating that because the current government system is
not effective in combating cyberattacks, the private sector will offer increasing offensive
protection measures that may escalate to “online vigilantism” if it continues without
regulation); Katharine C. Hinkle, Essay, Countermeasures in the Cyber Context: One More
Thing to Worry About, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 11, 11–12 (2011) (addressing the
growing debate about which international law applies to cyberattacks and what acts
constitute an “armed attack” under the law); see also Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the
Dilemma of State Responses to Cyberattacks: A Justification for the Use of Active Defenses
Against States Who Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 83 (2009)
(describing active defenses as a “new frontier” that will be controversial in any situation).
93. See, e.g., NRC REPORT, supra note 57, at 16 (explaining the potential for an active
defense to be construed as an offensive attack through hypotheticals involving two
imaginary nations); Condron, supra note 10, at 410–11 (advancing that active defense
measures typically utilize an in-kind response, where the attacked party will instigate an
offensive attack on the perpetrator using a similar strategy to what was used against them);
Joshua E. Kastenberg, Changing the Paradigm of Internet Access from Government
Information Systems: A Solution to the Need for the DOD to Take Time-Sensitive Action on
the NIPRNET, 64 A.F. L. REV. 175, 177–78 (2009) (addressing the military’s use of
cyberspace in both offensive and defensive roles and discussing the need to manage the
availability of access to cyberspace for conducting operations); Kesan & Hayes, supra note
10, at 460–73 (arguing that passive methods are ineffective in addressing cyberattacks, that
active defense is the most effective response in some circumstances, and that, to effectuate
such a response, more advanced technologies and policy guidelines are needed); Sklerov,
supra note 92, at 25 (assessing the specifics of how active computer attack measures can
function by detailing the transmission of a virus that disrupts the attacking hacker’s
machine).
94. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 10, at 467–69.
95. See Karen Kent Frederick, Network Intrusion Detection Signatures, Part One,
SYMANTEC,
http://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/network-intrusion-detectionsignatures-part-one (last updated Nov. 3, 2010) (detailing that an IDS signature could be
configured to detect “abnormal or suspicious traffic in general, not just attacks and probes”).
96. See Ethan Katz-Bassett et al., Reverse Traceroute, in PROCEEDINGS OF NSDI ’10:
7TH USENIX SYMPOSIUM ON NETWORKED SYSTEMS DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 219, 230
(2010), available at http://static.usenix.org/events/nsdi10/tech/full_papers/nsdi
10_proceedings.pdf (elaborating on the creation of a better “reverse traceroute” system).
97. See NRC REPORT, supra note 57, at 37 (warning that the technical difficulties of
attribution create a danger that a third party will be wrongfully targeted during a
counterattack); Condron, supra note 10, at 417 (asserting that while it may be possible to
easily attribute the source of a cyberattack to a computer system, it is oftentimes difficult to
attribute the fault to the specific person behind the attack because hackers often route attacks
through innocent third-party systems); Kesan & Hayes, supra note 10, at 464–65 (insisting
that technological advancements are necessary to facilitate more precise attribution and
thereby ensure more accurate counterattacks).
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The counterstrike phase of active defense is most relevant for the
purposes of the Third Amendment analysis. Any counterstrike will
necessarily impose risk of harm to innocent third parties, including
domestic companies and individuals, as has been discussed extensively in
self-help literature about cybersecurity.98 This is due, in part, to the
difficulty of attributing attacks to a specific source.99 Any attribution errors
in a U.S. counterstrike could thus result in harm to or intrusion of domestic
systems.
While current military cyberstrike capabilities remain classified, there
are already public sector security systems that implement hack-back
capabilities.100 One possibility, described in a post by Stewart Baker, is a
system that can “stake out the victim’s system, ready to give the attacker
bad files, to monitor the command and control machine, and to copy,
corrupt, or modify ex-filtrated material.”101 One problem with such a
system, as Baker acknowledges, occurs when the attacker “is using a
cutout—an intermediate command and control computer that actually
belongs to someone else.”102 Collecting from or sending files to an
intermediate computer could violate an innocent party’s privacy.103 This
theoretical privacy invasion is much more significant than Baker is willing
to admit, and the legal consequences of hacking back could be
substantial.104

98. See Jensen, supra note 89, at 237 (emphasizing the risk of destruction to systems of
neutral third-party nations in using an active computer network defense response); Neal
Katyal, Community Self-Help, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 33, 60–67 (2005) (advocating for a
more community-based preventative approach to cyberattacks due to the severe risks and
repercussions involved with counterattacks); Smith, supra note 89, at 183 (analogizing
modern cybercounterattacks to excessive old English landowner self-help measures, such as
a loaded spring gun set up to deter illegal intruders); Eugene Volokh, The Rhetoric of
Opposition to Self-Help, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 11, 2007, 3:22 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/posts/1176319370.shtml (summarizing the most common arguments
against counterattacks).
99. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
100. For example, ForeScout’s “ActiveResponse” technology is capable of performing
“perimeter defense” and actively identifying and blocking attackers. Jensen, supra note 89,
at 230.
101. Stewart Baker, RATs and Poison: Can Cyberespionage Victims Counterhack?,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 13, 2012, 8:05 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/10/15/
the-legal-case-against-hack-back-a-response-to-stewart-baker. Baker describes this system
as “RAT poison” because tools frequently used in cyberattacks are known as Remote
Access Tools (RATs). Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Orin Kerr, The Legal Case Against Hack-Back: A Response to Stewart Baker,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 15, 2012, 5:41 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/10/15/
the-legal-case-against-hack-back-a-response-to-stewart-baker (arguing that the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) unambiguously prohibits all hacking, including hacking
back, and that authorizing such counterattacks is ill-advised given the difficulty in locating
the source of an attack).
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The threats posed by hack-backs are so significant that, according to
security experts, hacking back “is one of those things that’s not even up for
discussion as far as security is concerned” and is “one thing you don’t
do.”105 This is because accurate attribution of an attack is “close to
impossible.”106 Inaccurate attribution could occur, for example, where a
malicious hacker uses an intermediate “zombie” system to carry out an
attack.107 A defensive system that hacks back could “strike” the apparent
source of the attack, but it would actually be harming an innocent thirdparty system.108
These hack-back tactics pose distinct threats to innocent third parties,
including those within the United States. As some commentators have
already discussed, an active cyberdefense operation by the U.S. military
against citizens might infringe civil liberties, including rights conferred by
the Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Clause, the Fifth Amendment
Due Process and Takings Clauses, and the Posse Comitatus Act.109 This
Article is meant to supplement that analysis by considering the Third
Amendment
implications
of
hack-backs,
cyberattacks,
and
cyberexploitations.
II. THE THIRD AMENDMENT AND THE CIVILIAN-MILITARY DIVIDE
The Third Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: “No Soldier
shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the
Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”110
While the full scope of Third Amendment protection has not been clearly
defined,111 its text and its history throughout the revolutionary period are
105. Michael Mimoso, Avoid the Landmine That Is Hacking Back, THREATPOST,
KASPERSKY LAB SECURITY NEWS SERVICE (Jan. 22, 2013, 11:45 AM), http://threatost.com
/en_us/blogs/avoid-landmine-hacking-back-012213.
106. Id. (noting that hacking back also violates the CFAA to the same extent that the
original attack did).
107. See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 10, at 442, 538–39 (describing the use of “zombies”
for Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks and noting the potential effects of a
counterstrike on such innocent systems).
108. Id. at 539.
109. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006); see, e.g., Condron, supra note 10, at 416–21 (explaining
due process and Posse Comitatus Act implications); Kesan & Hayes, supra note 10, at 520–
24, 452–55 (discussing statutory protections under the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act (ECPA), the CFAA, the Computer Security Act of 1987, and the Posse Comitatus Act,
as well as constitutional protections under the Fourth Amendment, the War Powers Clause,
the Due Process Clause, and the Takings Clause). The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the
use of military personnel to enforce domestic laws absent express constitutional or
congressional authorization. 18 U.S.C. § 1385; see also id. § 375 (requiring that the
Secretary of Defense proscribe regulations to ensure that no military member participate in
“search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless . . . otherwise authorized”).
110. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
111. The Second Circuit noted at the outset in its Third Amendment analysis in Engblom v.
Carey, 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982), that “[t]he absence of any case law directly construing this
provision presents a serious interpretive problem, and little illumination can be gleaned from the
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sufficient to guide its modern application.112 At its core, the anti-quartering
provision draws a clear line between private and public domains.113 It
protects individuals from the harms associated with military occupation,
especially during peacetime.114 It also strengthens common law property
rights by creating an absolute bar to military quartering under certain
circumstances.115 What remains uncertain is how far those protections
extend in a modern context where an expansive military and evolving
private spaces overlap more than any other time in history.
A. Third Amendment Basics
There are three primary sources of Third Amendment law: the text of
the amendment itself,116 federal and state cases published since its
adoption,117 and English common law prior to its adoption.118 A review of
these sources will aid application of the Third Amendment’s key terms:
“quartered,” “Soldier,” and “any house.”119 In its simplest form, the Third
Amendment prohibits quartering troops in a home during peacetime

debates of the Constitutional Convention.” Id. at 962.
112. For a thorough analysis of the history of the Third Amendment, see Fields &
Hardy, supra note 14. There are also a number of articles focused on analyzing the Third
Amendment from a historical perspective. See generally Bell, “Property” in the
Constitution, supra note 14; Bell, Forgotten but Not Gone, supra note 14; Gross, supra note
14; Schmidt, supra note 14; Wyatt, supra note 14.
113. Gross, supra note 14, at 219; see also Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 714–15
(2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Third Amendment’s prohibition on the quartering of troops during
times of peace reflected the Framers’ deep-seated beliefs about the sanctity of the home and
the need to prevent military intrusion into civilian life.”), rev’d on other grounds, 542 U.S.
426 (2004).
114. See Padilla, 352 F.3d at 714–15 (noting that the Framers prohibited military
intrusions during times of peace based on their “deep-seated beliefs about the sanctity of the
home,” but recognized that military needs could prevail during times of war).
115. See Bell, Forgotten but Not Gone, supra note 14, at 121 & n.28 (demonstrating that
the Third Amendment stemmed from a need to protect property rights); see also Engblom,
677 F.2d at 962 (rejecting the literal reading of the Third Amendment to apply solely to
citizens who possess a fee simple ownership in their house and instead assessing other
privacy interests found in the Constitution to comparatively interpret the Third
Amendment).
116. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
117. See, e.g., Padilla, 352 F.3d at 714–15 (finding that despite the Founders’ deeplyrooted beliefs against quartering, they provided for congressionally approved war-time
quartering based on military necessity); Engblom, 677 F.2d at 964 (ruling that the eviction
of correctional officers during a statewide strike and subsequent quartering of New York
State National Guardsmen in their state-provided homes could constitute a violation of the
Third Amendment); Fluke v. Canton, 123 P. 1049, 1053–54 31 (Okla. 1912) (discussing the
English roots of the anti-quartering right and noting that its nearly universal inclusion in
state constitutions “demonstrates the continued jealousy of the American people against the
encroachment by the military against civil authority”).
118. See Fields & Hardy, supra note 14 (detailing the rich history and development of
anti-quartering provisions in pre-revolutionary England); infra notes 124–28 and
accompanying text.
119. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
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without the consent of the “Owner.”120
From this basic structure, a review of any Third Amendment issue will
analyze the nature of the imposition (quartering), upon some private
property (any house), by a military element (Soldier).121 The Amendment
only permits quartering activity by either consent—in time of peace—or a
manner prescribed by law—in time of war.122 Adding to the complexity,
the Amendment and the jurisprudence lack a clear rule to apply during
times that could rightly be described as in between peace and war.123
The richest history and development of the anti-quartering provision
occurred in pre-revolutionary England.124 At the time when Congress
passed the Bill of Rights, the Third Amendment’s “roots were grounded in
the common law so thoroughly that Blackstone was able to state with
clarity, that ‘. . . the petition of right enacts, that no soldier shall be
quartered on the subject without his own consent.’”125 Given its long
history, English courts had numerous opportunities to interpret the scope of
the anti-quartering provision before it was incorporated into the Third
Amendment.126 These courts held that the term “houses” applies to both
private homes and buildings kept as inns.127 Additionally, the courts also
held that provisions related to the quartering of “Soldiers” were sufficiently

120. Id.; see Gross, supra note 14, at 217 (stating that the fundamental principle that
quartering in homes is not allowed without consent stemmed from seventh century British
Parliament).
121. See, e.g., Engblom, 677 F.2d at 961–62.
122. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
123. See Engblom, 677 F.2d at 961–62 (failing to discuss or establish a bright-line rule
for interpreting the Third Amendment in times in between peace and war); Schmidt, supra
note 14, at 616 (suggesting that compelling the quartering of soldiers without a clear
declaration of war would implicate due process concerns).
124. See Fields & Hardy, supra note 14, at 404–05, 411–12 (relating the “quartering
problem” back to the time of King Charles I and advancing that the anti-quartering
provision stemmed from the larger “individual rights” movement).
125. Id. at 411. The protection from involuntary quartering was included in the
Declaration of Rights enacted as the Bill of Rights by the English Parliament in 1689. Id. at
405. It was “drafted, not to introduce new principles of law, but merely as a recital of the
existing rights of Parliament and the subject, which [King] James had outraged, and which
[King] William must promise to observe.” Id. (quoting G.M. TREVELYAN, THE ENGLISH
REVOLUTION, 1688–1689, at 179–90 (1979)).
126. See Bell, Forgotten but Not Gone, supra note 14, at 117–29 (analyzing the origins
of the Third Amendment from its European roots to its entry into American constitutional
law); Fields & Hardy, supra note 14, at 394–95 (providing a detailed history of the rise in
legislation prohibiting the quartering of soldiers in times of peace and asserting that the right
against involuntary quartering was deeply embedded in English common law before the
American Revolution); Wyatt, supra note 14, at 124–33 (discussing history of English cases
on soldier quartering provisions).
127. See, e.g., Parker v. Flint, (1780) 88 Eng. Rep. 1303 (K.B.) 1303; 12 Mod. 254, 254–
55. The court held that a superseding war-time statute allowing constables to quarter
soldiers upon innkeepers should be “construed favourably without great necessity” and that
the building at issue did not count as an inn. Id. As a result, the constable who attempted to
quarter a dragoon and horse upon the (non-qualifying) inn was guilty of trespass. Id.

BUTLER.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

1222

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

7/3/2013 10:51 AM

[Vol. 62:1203

broad as to also implicate the quartering of soldiers’ horses.128
Various federal and state courts have made passing references to the
Third Amendment, but to date only the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has conducted an in-depth analysis of its application. In
Engblom v. Carey,129 correction officers at the Mid-Orange Correctional
Facility in New York brought an action against the Governor and other
state officials for violations of their Third Amendment and due process
rights.130 The plaintiffs were evicted from their facility-residences during a
statewide strike of correction officers, and members of the National Guard
were housed there without the consent of the correctional officers.131 The
Second Circuit ruled in favor of the correction officers at the summary
judgment stage and made three key Third Amendment holdings: first, that
the Third Amendment was incorporated for application to the states under
the Fourteenth Amendment;132 second, that under the Third Amendment,
National Guardsmen qualified as “Soldiers”;133 and third, that the plaintifftenants were “Owner[s]” of their residences, which qualified as a “house”
for the purposes of the Third Amendment.134
B. Implications of Third Amendment History
The boundaries of the Third Amendment can be better understood in
light of the history of its adoption and application throughout America and
England during the pre-revolutionary period.135 The anti-quartering
provision was first adopted in England in response to the growing concern
over standing armies maintained by the King.136 The doctrine then evolved
to incorporate principles of control over private property and compensation
for government impositions.137
The quartering of troops in pre128. See, e.g., Read v. Willan, (1780) 99 Eng. Rep. 271 (K.B.) 273; 2 Dougl. 422, 426.
129. 677 F.3d 957 (2d Cir. 2003).
130. Id. at 958.
131. Id. at 958–59.
132. Id. at 961.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 962–64.
135. The history of this period relevant to the adoption of the Third Amendment is
covered extensively in prior literature, so this section only provides a brief summary of
relevant portions. For a more in depth review of the history, see Bell, Forgotten but Not
Gone, supra note 14; and Fields & Hardy, supra note 14.
136. See Bell, Forgotten but Not Gone, supra note 14, at 123–24 (discussing the role that
the English common law played in the development of the Third Amendment and the
historical circumstances from which it arose).
137. According to Justice Story:
[The Third Amendment] speaks for itself. Its plain object is to secure the perfect
enjoyment of that great right of the common law, that a man’s house shall be his
own castle, privileged against all civil and military intrusion. The billeting of
soldiers in time of peace upon the people has been a common resort of arbitrary
princes, and is full of inconvenience and peril.
3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1893, at
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revolutionary America was considered an unbearable imposition and was
cited as a key grievance by the colonists.138
The problems presented by the presence of soldiers among the civilian
population are “as old as antiquity,”139 but the quartering problem came
into special focus during the seventeenth century upheavals in England.140
The source of this civilian grievance was inextricably linked with the
political issue of the use and maintenance of standing armies.141 Trouble
between soldiers and the civilian population continued to be an issue and
resulted in the addition of an anti-quartering right in the 1689 Declaration
of Rights.142
The Third Amendment was derived from the same anti-quartering
sentiment that arose in seventeenth century England following the civil war
and the Third Anglo-Dutch War.143 The 1679 Anti-Quartering Act144
protected British citizens from military intrusion for more than a hundred
years before the law changed for the colonists. During the prerevolutionary period, the British Parliament passed the Quartering Act of
1765,145 which required colonists to provide barracks and supplies for
soldiers stationed in the Colonies.146 The British later expanded this
provision with the Quartering Act of 1774,147 which provided for further
military housing in “uninhabited houses, out-houses, barns, or other
buildings.”148
The colonists strongly rejected even the possibility of quartering in their
private property, and the British had “scrupulously avoided” the use of

747 (Boston, Hillard, Gray & Co. 1833).
138. See Fields & Hardy, supra note 14, at 416. As Fields and Hardy describe,
resentment against “the involuntary quartering of soldiers found expression in the First
Continental Congress’s Declaration of Resolves of 1774, and in the Declaration of
Independence of 1776.” Id. at 417 (citation omitted).
139. See id. at 395.
140. See id. at 402–13 (explaining that the quartering problem advanced England
towards civil war).
141. See Bell, Forgotten but Not Gone, supra note 14, at 117–29 (explaining that
guarantees such as the one provided in the Third Amendment have historically been used to
prevent forced billeting of troops in civilians’ homes); Fields & Hardy, supra note 14, at
402–06 (describing the right in England in relation to the King’s desire to maintain a
standing army).
142. Bell, Forgotten but Not Gone, supra note 14, at 124.
143. Id. at 124–25.
144. Billeting Act, 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 1, § 32 (“[N]oe officer Military or Civill nor any
other person whatever shall from henceforth presume to place quarter or billet any Souldier
or Souldiers upon any Subject or Inhabitant of this Realme . . . without his consent . . . .”).
145. An Act for Punishing Mutiny and Desertion, and for the Better Payment of the
Army and Their Quarters, 1765, 5 Geo. 3, c. 33 (Eng.).
146. Id.; Bell, Forgotten but Not Gone, supra note 14, at 126.
147. An Act for the Better Providing Suitable Quarters for Officers and Soldiers in His
Majesty’s Service in North America, 1774, 14 Geo. 3, c. 54 (Eng.).
148. Id. § 2.
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private homes under the 1765 Act.149 Nonetheless, the First Congress
made sure to include a sweeping anti-quartering provision in the Bill of
Rights. The objections that gave rise to the Third Amendment’s nearly
universal adoption were rooted in control over private property and the
ability to exclude military influences and impositions.150
This right to control property has been recognized by modern courts as
establishing important “zones of privacy” along with the First, Fourth, and
Fifth Amendments. In Griswold v. Connecticut,151 the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized the Third Amendment’s prohibition against quartering as one of
the many “facet[s]” of privacy incorporated into the Bill of Rights.152
Similarly, the Court in Katz v. United States153 emphasized that the Third
Amendment is one of a handful of provisions in the Constitution that
protects “personal privacy” from “government intrusion.”154
C. Interaction Between the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments
The Third Amendment, like the Fourth Amendment155 and Fifth
These zones are
Amendment,156 creates “zones of privacy.”157
complimentary, and courts will generally avoid interpretations that would
bring them into disharmony.158 Many actions that infringe one right may
also infringe another. For example, the quartering of troops on private
property without consent or compensation might constitute both a violation
of the Third Amendment and a violation of the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause.159 The actions of quartered troops might also run afoul of the

149. J. Alan Rogers, Colonial Opposition to the Quartering of Troops During the French
and Indian War, 34 MIL. AFF. 7, 10 (1970).
150. See Dugan, supra note 14, at 560–71 (discussing the meaning of the quartering right
based on founding-era documents).
151. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
152. Id. at 484.
153. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
154. Id. at 350 n.5.
155. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.”).
156. Id. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”).
157. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484; see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
158. See id. at 484–86 (stating that the citizen has a zone of privacy stemming from the
collection of all privacy rights and that the Ninth Amendment does not allow for one right to
be disparaged over the other).
159. See Bell, Forgotten but Not Gone, supra note 14, at 146–48 (analyzing the
distinction between quartering and takings and arguing that “the Fifth Amendment should
guarantee that those who suffer quartering receive just compensation for their losses”).
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Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Clause160 or the First Amendment
Free Association Clause.161
Still it is important to analyze each of these rights separately. It is
particularly important to distinguish between the application of the Third
Amendment quartering provision and the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
for several reasons. First, the quartering provision covers a narrower range
of government actions.162 Second, the Takings Clause is more permissive
than the quartering provision and could allow occupation of private
property even absent consent.163 And third, while the quartering and
takings provisions are not mutually exclusive, they can provide
independent and distinct remedies.164
The analysis of Third Amendment protections may occasionally overlap
with analysis under the Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures,165 and the Fifth Amendment right to
due process.166 While these rights might also provide relief in some
circumstances, they will be inapplicable in many cases where the clear
prohibition of the Third Amendment remains in force.167 This is especially
true where matters of national security are concerned.168
III. APPLYING THE THIRD AMENDMENT TO MILITARY CYBEROPERATIONS
The Third Amendment prohibitions govern military intrusions onto
private property. Cyberoperations can affect private computers and
networks, including innocent third-party systems.169 As the U.S. military
develops its strategy and begins to conduct cyberoperations, its actions
160. Schmidt, supra note 14, at 663–65.
161. Id.
162. See Bell, Forgotten but Not Gone, supra note 14, at 118, 146–49 (evaluating the
Third Amendment as a “form of taking” and applying analysis from Fifth Amendment
cases).
163. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982)
(holding that the physical occupation of a building by cable company facilities was a
“taking” requiring just compensation). The Takings Clause provides for compensation for
public uses, rather than relying on “Owner” consent. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
164. Bell, Forgotten but Not Gone, supra note 14, at 146–48.
165. See, e.g., Dugan, supra note 14, at 575–82 (discussing the different protections of
and purposes behind the Fourth and Third Amendments).
166. See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 14, at 616, 663–65 (evaluating possible due process
issues and asserting that the Third Amendment’s application must remain narrower than the
Fourth Amendment’s because, to find otherwise, “would essentially delete the term soldier
in the amendment and replace it with government agent”).
167. See, e.g., James P. Rogers, Note, Third Amendment Protections in Domestic
Disasters, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 747, 748–50 (2008) (describing military relief
efforts in post-Katrina New Orleans and arguing that they constituted unlawful quartering
even though they did not violate Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights).
168. See generally Dugan, supra note 14, at 584–86 (assessing the implications of Third
Amendment prohibitions for the NSA’s warrantless wiretapping program).
169. See id. at 587 (concluding that the Third Amendment is highly relevant today and
could apply to government intrusions on civilian life, such as wiretapping).
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affecting domestic systems must comply with Third Amendment
principles.
Each category of cyberoperations has the potential to affect private
systems in the United States. The use of a self-replicating virus or worm,
such as Stuxnet, can result in widespread infection beyond the intended
military target. Even more targeted cyberexploits, such as Flame or Red
October, use intermediate networks and devices to gain access to their
targets. Additionally, a retaliatory strike or hack-back may harm an
innocent third-party system rather than the actual attacker. The Third
Amendment governs all of these situations if the affected system belongs to
someone under U.S. jurisdiction.
To determine whether the Third Amendment prohibits a given military
cyberoperation, the relevant inquiry would be: (1) is the computer or
network device property protected as part of “any house,” and (2) does the
military intrusion constitute “quartering” by a “Soldier”? If the network or
device is protected, and the military intrusion constitutes quartering, then
consent is required under the Third Amendment during times of peace and
a formal legal enactment is required during times of war.
A. The Private Property Protected by the Third Amendment Includes
Computer and Network Infrastructure
The first issue relevant to the Third Amendment analysis of military
cyberoperations is whether civilian computers and networks are protected.
The Third Amendment prohibits quartering “in any house.”170 This
provision could be interpreted as protecting only residential buildings, as
opposed to the “persons, houses, papers, and effects” protected by the
Fourth Amendment.171 However, the history of the Third Amendment
indicates that it governs “quartering” on excludable private property
generally, regardless of the specific structure or parcel used.172 In
respecting the “Owner[’s]” right to exclude, the scope of the Third
Amendment may in fact be broader than the Fourth Amendment.173 The
only federal court to fully analyze and apply the Third Amendment in a
modern context took a similarly broad view of the protected property
right.174
170. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
171. Id. amend. IV.
172. See Dugan, supra note 14, at 581 (employing the history of the Third Amendment,
along with an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to “suggest that the term [any house]
was meant to cover all areas in which an individual has a right to exclude”).
173. See id. at 582 (rejecting a narrow view of the term “any house” and instead arguing
that the term has been broadly interpreted throughout history to protect “‘any’ private area
in which an individual ‘Owner’ can claim a right to exclude,” contrary to the Fourth
Amendment, which protects only “persons, houses, papers, and effects”).
174. See Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 961–64 (2d Cir. 1982) (characterizing the
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The history surrounding the ratification of the Third Amendment also
suggests that a broad view is appropriate. The English quartering statutes
traditionally provided for quartering in “public houses” during wartime,175
including the 1765 provision governing quartering in the Colonies.176
These statutes specifically listed the types of structures that could be used
for quartering.177 This was even true of the Quartering Act of 1774, one of
the “intolerable acts” that revolutionary colonists cited in the lead up to the
war.178 Notably, British soldiers “were not quartered in private colonial
houses” during the pre-revolutionary period.179
When the Third
Amendment was enacted, however, Congress rejected an alternative
proposal that would have allowed billeting of soldiers in public houses and
inns.180 Rather than provide specific rules based on the classification of
property, Congress adopted a general prohibition governing “any house.”181
The Second Circuit adopted a broad view of the Third Amendment’s
property protections in Engblom.182 There, the court analyzed the Third
Amendment’s application based on its role in assuring “a fundamental right
to privacy,” as noted by the Supreme Court in Griswold.183 The Second
Circuit rejected a rigid application of the term “Owner” because it “would
be wholly anomalous when viewed, for example, alongside established
Fourth Amendment doctrine” that protects tenants.184 The court ultimately
held that the Third Amendment’s property-based privacy interests are not
Third Amendment as applying to tenants in addition to “Owner[s]” that possess a fee simple
interest in their homes). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, however, relied
on Engblom’s Third Amendment analysis and found that the Air Force did not violate the
Third Amendment by flying over plaintiff’s property because there is no right to exclude
aircraft in the navigable airspace. Custer Cnty. Action Ass’n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024,
1043 (10th Cir. 2001).
175. Wyatt, supra note 14, at 142–43.
176. An Act for Punishing Mutiny and Desertion, and for the Better Payment of the
Army and Their Quarters, 1765, 5 Geo. 3, c. 33 (Eng.).
177. See An Act for the Better Providing Suitable Quarters for Officers and Soldiers in
His Majesty’s Service in North America, 1774, 14 Geo. 3, c. 54 (Eng.) (specifying
“uninhabited house, outhouse, [and] barns”); An Act for Punishing Mutiny and Desertion,
and for the Better Payment of the Army and Their Quarters, 1765, 5 Geo. 3, c. 33 (Eng.)
(listing, among other places, “inns, livery stables, ale-houses, victualling-houses, . . .
uninhabited houses, outhouses, [and] barns”).
178. An Act for the Better Providing Suitable Quarters for Officers and Soldiers in His
Majesty’s Service in North America, 1774, 14 Geo. 3, c. 54 (Eng.); see Wyatt, supra note
14, at 143. Resentment against “the involuntary quartering of soldiers found expression in
the First Continental Congress’s Declaration of Resolves of 1774, and in the Declaration of
Independence of 1776.” Fields & Hardy, supra note 14, at 417 (citation omitted).
179. JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE
AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 194 (1986); see Rogers, supra note 149, at 10 (noting that
“[q]uartering in private homes was scrupulously avoided” under the 1765 Act).
180. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS
217–19 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).
181. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
182. 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982).
183. Id. at 962 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–85 (1965)).
184. Id.
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limited only to those “Owner[s]” who possess a fee simple ownership of
their residence but instead protect citizens who lawfully occupy or possess
a residence.185
In a more recent case, Custer County Action Ass’n v. Garvey,186 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected a claim under the Third
Amendment based on the military use of airspace over a plaintiff’s
home.187 The court reviewed the claim under the Engblom framework and
found that the plaintiffs had no general right to exclude planes traversing
the airspace over their property.188 The Supreme Court had reached a
similar conclusion under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause years earlier
in United States v. Causby.189 Thus, the Tenth Circuit followed a similar
analysis of the Third Amendment where “any home” was defined as a
property area in which an individual has a right to exclude others.190
When framed as a right to exclude the military from private property, it
is clear that computers, networks, and other systems fall within the scope of
the Third Amendment. The phrase “any house” encompasses all forms of
property that fit within the typical paradigm. Rather than include or
exclude certain types of property, the Framers opted for broad language.191
Civilian networked devices will necessarily fall within this category
because they are maintained within, and are a component of, private
property. Hacking is analogous to a trespass,192 and typical home and
corporate systems can also rightfully be classified as private property.193
185. Id.
186. 256 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 2001).
187. Id. at 1042–44.
188. Id.
189. 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) (noting that Congress declared “[t]he air is a public
highway” and that “[c]ommon sense revolts at the idea” of aircraft operators being subject to
trespass suits based on property ownership interests stretching into the sky).
190. Garvey, 256 F.3d at 1043.
191. See Wyatt, supra note 14, at 142–47 (reviewing the possible interpretations relevant
to whether university property would be protected under the Third Amendment and arguing
that the term “any house” should be interpreted broadly to include such property).
192. Susan W. Brenner, Is There Such a Thing as “Virtual Crime”?, 4 CAL. CRIM. L.
REV. 1, ¶ 81 (2001); Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and
“Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1606 (2003); see
Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1021 (2001)
(“The crime of unauthorized access is one of simply invading another’s workspace.”).
193. See, e.g., Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 471–73 (Ct. App.
1996) (imposing liability under a claim for trespass on personal property where a child
hacked into a phone company’s computer system to make free long-distance telephone
calls); see also Daniel Benoliel, Law, Geography, and Cyberspace: The Case of On-Line
Territorial Privacy, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 125, 181 (2005) (discussing the Bezenek
case); Wendy Leibowitz, Imposing Order on E-Chaos: It’s Time To Seize the Bull by the
Horns and Set Sound E-mail Policies for the Workplace, LAW PRAC. MGMT., Nov.–Dec.
2002, at 8, 10 (recognizing that “company computers are private property”); Cody
Wamsley, Internet Transmissions: Who Owns the Data and Who Protects It?, J. INTERNET
LAW, Feb. 2008, at 3, 7 (“It is settled law that someone can own a computer as chattel.”).
See generally Laura Quilter, The Continuing Expansion of Cyberspace Trespass to Chattels,
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Invasion of these systems is prohibited by comprehensive federal laws that
recognize this general right to exclude.194
B. Military Software Placed on a Home or Business Network or
Computer Device Is “Quartered” for Third Amendment Purposes
Having established that the Third Amendment protects private networks
and computer systems, it is necessary to consider whether military
cyberoperations can be “quartered” on these systems. While the conclusion
that a military cyberoperation constitutes quartering in a system would be a
novel application of the quartering provision,195 it would be consistent with
the purposes and principles underlying the Third Amendment. There are at
least two interpretive hurdles relevant to this inquiry: (1) whether
computer software and files can be “quartered” at all, and (2) whether these
elements are indeed an extension of the regulated “Soldier” used in the
Third Amendment. The language can be reasonably interpreted to apply to
certain military cyberoperations, especially given the underlying concern of
the Third Amendment: that military personnel will cause harm to civilians
by imposing on their private property.196
As it relates to the first hurdle, cyberoperations may constitute quartering
because they involve trespassing into and placing files on a private system.
The long history of quartering was focused primarily on the provision of
lodging to members of the military.197 The modern usage of the term
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 421, 430–35 (2002) (summarizing four cases concerning trespass
to chattels in cyberspace).
194. See, e.g., Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006 & Supp. V
2012) (providing victims with a civil cause of action against cyber criminals); Telephone
Records and Privacy Protection Act of 2006, id. § 1039 (2006) (providing a right to exclude
in the context of confidential phone records information). See generally Patricia L. Bellia,
Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164 (2004) (reviewing the current legal
framework for protecting “cyberproperty”).
195. This application, however, is not as novel as Third Amendment claims suggested by
other commentators. See, e.g., Morriss & Stroup, supra note 14, at 798 (arguing that the
Third Amendment should be interpreted to invalidate the Endangered Species Act).
196. U.S. CONST. amend. III; see Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1972) (asserting
that the Third Amendment empowers the federal courts to provide redress for claims of
“judicially cognizable injury resulting from military intrusion into the civilian sector”); see
also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607 n.* (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The Third
Amendment’s prohibition against the unconsented peacetime quartering of soldiers protects
another aspect of privacy from governmental intrusion.”); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 350 n.5 (1967) (same); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (same); Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 549 (1961) (recognizing that the Third Amendment protects the
privacy of the home); Wyatt, supra note 14, at 124–33 (arguing that the Third Amendment
protects property rather than privacy).
197. William Sutton Fields, The Third Amendment: Constitutional Protection from the
Involuntary Quartering of Soldiers, 124 MIL. L. REV. 195, 195–204 (1989) (reviewing
English and American history to pinpoint the meaning of “quartering” for purposes of the
Third Amendment); Rogers, supra note 14, at 767 (using Samuel Johnson’s 1755
Dictionary of the English Language to ascertain the scope of the term “quarter”); Wyatt,
supra note 14, at 147–51 (analyzing late seventeenth and early eighteenth century English
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“quarter,”—to “lodge, or dwell,”198—generally matches the traditional
definition of “quarter” at the time of the framing—“to lodge; to fix on a
temporary dwelling.”199 Furthermore, the modern definition of “to
lodge”—“to provide temporary quarters for” or “to establish or settle in a
place”200—also tracks the traditional definition of “to lodge”—”[t]o place
in a temporary habitation” or “[t]o afford place to.”201 At a minimum, it is
clear that the quartering concept encompasses “something less than a
permanent occupation.”202 It is unclear whether any mere trespass would
suffice, or whether there must be some extended use of the private property
to constitute quartering.203
Given the definition and purpose of the quartering provision, it is likely
that cyberoperations could constitute quartering to the extent that they
involve intruding into and placing files on a private system. These files can
cause damage and impose costs on the “Owners” similar to the “Soldier[s]”
quartered in a traditional Third Amendment case.
The second issue involves whether these cyberoperations fall within the
Third Amendment because they are carried out by “Soldier[s].” The
problem of applying the traditional legal principles of warfare to the
cyberspace domain is not a new one. A great deal of recent scholarship has
focused on the application of international law in cyberspace.204 While the
analysis of cyberattacks under customary international law and the law of
war focus on the use of physical force, the military attribution of these
operations is a baseline assumption of all the analysis.205 The term
cyberoperations is used throughout a forthcoming cyberwar manual to refer
to the “employment of cyber capabilities with the primary purpose of
achieving objectives in or by the use of cyberspace.”206 Cyberoperations
are military operations to the extent that USCYBERCOM is executing or
coordinating the operations. Consequently, the Third Amendment governs
jurisprudence and vocabulary to define “quartering” for purposes of the Third Amendment).
198. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1018 (11th ed. 2003).
199. 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1619 (1st ed. 1755).
200. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S, supra note 198, at 731.
201. JOHNSON, supra note 199, at 1218.
202. Wyatt, supra note 14, at 149.
203. But see Luther v. Borden 48 U.S. 1, 48, 67 (1849) (Woodbury, J., dissenting)
(arguing that forced entry of militiamen into a home constituted a Third Amendment
violation).
204. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 9, at 14–15 (comparing Koh’s approach against the
Tallinn Manual in applying international law to cyberspace); Koh, supra note 9 (addressing
the Obama Administration’s views on how international law applies in cyberspace); see also
TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 9 (identifying international law applicable to cyberwarfare
and proposing ninety-five black letter rules to regulate cyberspace).
205. See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 9, at 51 (“A nexus between the cyber
operation in question and military operations heightens the likelihood of characterization as
a use of force.”).
206. Id. at 24.
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a cyberoperation’s invasion of private property.
This view is consistent with both a broad reading of the anti-quartering
right in English cases as well as the Second Circuit’s holding in
Engblom.207 There is English common law, for example, related to the
quartering of horses in “actual service.”208 The horses were merely an
instrumentality of war used by the soldiers, but they were considered
quartered at common law.209 Similarly, in Engblom, the Second Circuit
held that the National Guardsmen were considered “Soldiers” within the
meaning of the Third Amendment because they were “state employees
under the control of the Governor.”210 The degree of military “control” was
key in both cases.211
Under this analysis, quartering of “Soldiers” in private computer systems
occurs when military operators directly or indirectly employ files or
software that accesses and places itself upon a private system. Typically, a
C&C server will direct cyberoperations that another group is responsible
for configuring.212 In the case of an active defense system, a remote or
Regardless,
local system could also control the operation.213
USCYBERCOM closely controls and manages any cyberoperation that the
United States currently undertakes.214
IV. DESIGNING A NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY POLICY INFORMED BY
THIRD AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES
The preceding analysis of cyberoperations under the Third Amendment
is focused primarily on the potential privacy impact of U.S. military
intrusions into private networks. Given that the Third Amendment
embodies the core value of protecting private property from military

207. See generally Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982) (providing a
framework for interpreting the Third Amendment).
208. See, e.g., Read v. Willan, (1780) 99 Eng. Rep. 271 (K.B.) 273; 2 Dougl. 422, 426
(“Under the distinction that these horses were mustered, and to be considered, as in actual
service, (which I think, upon the case stated, they were,) I am of opinion they were
billetable.”).
209. See, e.g., id. at 271, 273; 2 Dougl. at 423, 426.
210. Engblom, 677 F.2d at 961.
211. See id. (holding that National Guardsmen are “Soldiers” for Third Amendment
purposes); Read, 99 Eng. Rep. at 271–73; 2 Dougl. at 422–26 (holding that the horses in
question were billetable under the Mutiny Act because they were in “actual service” under a
route from the commander in chief and rejecting the argument that the horses were not
billetable because they were hired under contract rather than employed by the army).
212. See supra Part I.A–B (discussing different types of cyberoperations that are directed
by a C&C server configured by the responsible attacker).
213. See supra text accompanying notes 101–02 (observing that one problem with an
active defense system is that the responsible attacker can use an intermediate system that
actually belongs to someone else).
214. See U.S. Cyber Command, supra note 20 (explaining that USCYBERCOM is
charged with U.S. military cyberspace operations).

BUTLER.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

1232

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

7/3/2013 10:51 AM

[Vol. 62:1203

intrusion, its principles should inform the broader debate over
cybersecurity policy.
The President, the DoD, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
and Congress are all currently involved in developing a comprehensive
cybersecurity strategy.215 The DoD established USCYBERCOM in 2009
to advance the technical and operational capabilities necessary to
implement a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy.216 Congress considered
competing proposals in 2012—both of which focused on creating a new
‘information sharing’ environment between private companies and
government.217
The President has issued a directive establishing
“principles and processes for the use of cyber operations,”218 and conducted
an internal legal analysis of his authority vis-à-vis cyberwarfare.219
Yet, so far, none of these efforts have adequately addressed the civil
liberties impact of cyberoperations. Even though the White House issued
a “Cyberspace Policy Review” stressing the need to “conduct a national
dialogue on cybersecurity” and reaffirming “the national commitment to
privacy rights and civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and
law,”220 the administration has not yet engaged in such a dialogue. Some
within the DoD have acknowledged that there will be difficult questions
in applying traditional legal rules to cyberspace, but so far, the DoD has
not provided solutions.221 Congress has focused on eliminating privacy
rules that it claims would hamper corporate information sharing with the
DHS and NSA.222

215. See generally Kesan & Hayes, supra note 10, at 460–62 (discussing recent federal
initiatives by the President, DHS, DoD, and Congress).
216. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, U.S. CYBER COMMAND FACT SHEET (May 25, 2010).
217. See Brendan Sasso, Longtime Friends Lieberman, McCain Divided Over
Cybersecurity Legislation, HILL (Mar. 14, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon
-valley/technology/215907-senators-mccain-lieberman-disagree-its-a-real-doozy (reporting that
while Senators Lieberman and McCain introduced opposing bills for cybersecurity
regulation, both proposals contain an information sharing component).
218. Obama Signs Secret Cybersecurity Directive, NAT’L J. (Nov. 14, 2012, 3:35 PM),
http://www.nationaljournal.com/blogs/techdailydose/2012/11/obama-signs-secretcybersecurity-directive-14.
219. Sanger & Shanker, supra note 19.
220. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW: ASSURING A
TRUSTED AND RESILIENT INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE, at i (2009)
[hereinafter CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov
/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf.
221. See, e.g., Greer, supra note 10, at 141 (arguing that the NSA must “allay concerns
about civil liberties violations” by “maintaining transparency, by continuing oversight, and
by establishing clarity of roles and missions”).
222. See Hayley Tsukayama, CISPA: Who’s for It, Who’s Against It and How It Could
Affect You, WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
technology/cispa-whos-for-it-whos-against-it-and-how-it-could-affect-you/2012/04/27/
gIQA5ur0lT_story.html (observing that CISPA “could be interpreted to allow companies to
share any of their customers’ personal data as long as the companies say that the
information is related to a ‘cyber threat’”).
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The Third Amendment implications of military cyberoperations raise
three important questions that should guide the development of
cybersecurity policy going forward: (1) Can the President alone authorize
military actions that have the potential to intrude upon civilian networks?
(2) How can “consent” be granted for such cyberspace operations? (3)
Would the United States be forced to admit attribution for a given attack if
it intruded upon an innocent third-party network? These questions address
the three key elements of a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy:
authority, cooperation, and transparency.
A. Authority: Congress Must Be Involved in Establishing Any
Framework for the Authorization of Cyberoperations
Given that the Third Amendment requires war-time quartering be
conducted “in a manner to be prescribed by law,”223 Congress must have a
role in establishing the framework used to authorize any offensive
cyberoperation. This legislative involvement would not only ensure that all
cyberoperations have adequate legal authorization but it would also
promote the broader goals of transparency and cooperation that the
President has emphasized throughout this process.
So far Congress has focused its energy on perceived problems rather
than real solutions.224 A debate raged in the 112th Congress over whether
to let DHS or NSA take the lead on a proposed information-sharing
environment.225 This turf war was quite tangential from the problems of
substandard security for critical systems and a lack of legal clarity as to the
role of each government agency in responding to an external threat or
strategic opportunity.226 The only congressional involvement in developing
a cybersecurity framework so far has been its brief affirmance in the 2012
National Defense Authorization Act227 that the President may conduct
“operations in cyberspace” subject to the traditional legal regimes
applicable to kinetic warfare.228 Congress’s active role in setting our
223. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
224. See, e.g., Sasso, supra note 217 (discussing Senators Lieberman and McCain’s
focus on whether a civilian or military agency should coordinate the cybersecurity program
rather than on improved security standards).
225. Id.
226. See CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW, supra note 220, at i (recognizing that the
“[r]esponsibilities for cybersecurity are distributed across a wide array of federal
departments and agencies, many with overlapping authorities, and none with sufficient
decision authority to direct actions that deal with often conflicting issues in a consistent
way”); see also Kesan & Hayes, supra note 10, at 458–60 (describing the current danger to
critical national infrastructure).
227. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125
Stat. 1298 (2011).
228. Id. § 954. The provision states:
Congress affirms that the Department of Defense has the capability, and upon
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nation’s military actions in cyberspace is the only way to have a national
dialogue and to avoid relying on secret legal interpretations about
important national security matters.
The President took steps to begin a national dialogue when he issued an
Executive Order on the same day as the 2013 State of the Union
The Executive Order focused on improving critical
Address.229
infrastructure cybersecurity while promoting privacy, civil liberties, and the
economy.230 The Order also provided for sharing of “cyber threat
information” from executive branch agencies to private sector entities,231
and the development of a framework by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) to establish baseline security standards for
government agencies and critical infrastructure companies.232 The Order
also required that privacy and civil liberties protections be incorporated
into the cybersecurity program and that the Chief Privacy Officer of DHS
assess the privacy risks and publish a report.233
The Executive Order did not address the “information sharing
environment” proposed in Congress during 2012 and again in 2013.234 The
Order also did not address the legal determination of when and how
cyberoperations can be authorized, which has apparently already been
made in an internal executive-branch memorandum.235 The President’s
Executive Order is a step in the right direction but it does not provide
sufficient authority for cyberoperations that could intrude upon civilian
systems; only Congress can authorize such quartering.
B. Cooperation: The Private Sector Has an Interest in Increasing

direction by the President may conduct offensive operations in cyberspace to
defend our Nation, Allies and interests, subject to—
(1) the policy principles and legal regimes that the Department follows for
kinetic capabilities, including the law of armed conflict; and
(2) the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541 et seq.).
Id.
229. Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,737 (Feb. 19, 2013); see Andy Greenberg,
President Obama’s Cybersecurity Executive Order Scores Much Better than CISPA on
Privacy, FORBES (Feb. 12, 2013, 10:37 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg
/2013/02/12/president-obamas-cybersecurity-executive-order-scores-much-better-thancispa-on-privacy.
230. Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,739.
231. Id. at 11,739–40.
232. Id. at 11,740–41.
233. Id. at 11,740.
234. See Chris O’Brien, CISPA Passes House Committee, Angering Privacy Activists,
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2013, 4:38 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tncispa-passes-house-committee-20130410,0,7554885.story.
235. See Sanger & Shanker, supra note 19 (“A secret legal review on the use of
America’s growing arsenal of cyberweapons has concluded that President Obama has the
broad power to order a pre-emptive strike if the United States detects credible evidence of a
major digital attack looming from abroad, according to officials involved in the review.”).
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Security, and Public-Private Collaboration Is Necessary To Address This
Issue
The current cybersecurity frameworks being considered by Congress and
the President both rely on broad private-sector cooperation to improve
security standards and limit the risk of future attacks.236 This collaborative
process not only makes good practical sense, because private companies
directly control many target systems,237 but the process also facilitates a
consent mechanism that limits the Third Amendment implications of
cyberoperations.238 An intrusion, whether intentional or inadvertent, would
be permissible under the Third Amendment with the “Owner[’s]”
consent.239
There may be circumstances where threat detection is coordinated by
both military and private sector entities, and these relationships will
necessarily involve consent. The alternative is giving only military
agencies control over the standards-setting process, which some members
of Congress have proposed240 but the President’s Executive Order
rejected.241 Under the military-control system, USCYBERCOM would be
able to engage in “active defense” operations without public notice or
consent.
The more difficult question involves the extent to which third-party
companies will provide the DoD access to private customer data as part of
the “threat detection” effort. These users have strong privacy interests in
their data, and also an expectation that they can control who has access to
it.242 The Executive Order’s proposed framework lead by NIST solves both
problems by providing a consent mechanism that is both cooperative and
transparent.243

236. See Gus P. Coldebella & Brian M. White, Foundational Questions Regarding the
Federal Role in Cybersecurity, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 233, 240–41 (2010) (arguing that
it is critical to create a safe space for public-private collaboration and to promote proper
security standards).
237. Id.
238. See id. at 240 (stating that eighty-five percent of the nation’s infrastructure is owned
by the private sector).
239. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
240. Strengthening and Enhancing Cybersecurity by Using Research, Education,
Information, and Technology (SECURE IT) Act of 2012, S. 3342, 112th Cong. (2012)
(proposing cybersecurity centers managed by the President in the interests of national
security to collect and share cyber “threat information”).
241. Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,737, 11,741 (Feb. 19, 2013) (indicating
that the Secretary of Homeland Security, a civilian agency, shall coordinate the new
cybersecurity program).
242. See, e.g., Tsukayama, supra note 222 (warning Internet users about how the White
House’s passage of the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act could affect them).
243. Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,741 (“The Cybersecurity
Framework . . . shall meet the requirements of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology Act . . . .”).
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C. Transparency: Any Comprehensive Cybersecurity Strategy Must
Include Both Public Accountability and Open Discussion of the Civil
Liberties Impacts
Given the important public interests at stake in the cybersecurity
debate—security, privacy, and civil rights—it will be critical that there be
adequate transparency and accountability in the comprehensive framework.
The cyberattack attribution problem should not be treated like a doubleedged sword that can prevent identification of foreign attackers and lead to
mistaken retaliation against innocent intermediaries, while shielding the
United States from accountability when it makes a mistake. If military
cyberoperations intrude upon civilian property, there could very well be
legal consequences including public attribution and accountability. It is
better to embrace this accountability than to run from it.
An attribution requirement would challenge the current national security
orthodoxy. For more than sixty years the DoD has focused on controlling
information: more of it for them, less of it for everyone else.244 The state
secrets privilege, classification, and other methods of executive branch
secrecy have created a secret-war framework built on a “shaky legal and
political foundation” according to Professor Jack Goldsmith.245 In order to
maintain political and constitutional legitimacy, it is necessary to revise the
current military decisionmaking process to enable greater transparency and
accountability.246 Justification for military operations cannot rely solely on
classified legal interpretations or sealed court filings; the ongoing
development of constitutional rights requires that citizens know what the
government is doing.247 Military secrecy would otherwise negate the very
244. See generally Carrie Newton Lyons, The State Secrets Privilege: Expanding Its
Scope Through Government Misuse, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99 (2007) (arguing that the
government has misapplied the state secrets privilege doctrine to obtain broad protection of
its information collection activities, intruding upon private constitutional and statutory
rights); Jeremy Telman, Intolerable Abuses: Rendition for Torture and the State Secrets
Privilege, 63 ALA. L. REV. 429 (2012).
245. See Jack Goldsmith, U.S. Needs a Rulebook for Secret Warfare, WASH. POST (Feb.
5, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/us-needs-rules-of-engagement-forsecret-warfare/2013/02/05/449f786e-6a78-11e2-95b3-272d604a10a3_story.html
(identifying some recent secret wars fought on tenuous legal grounds and how the
government has secretly assessed its own authority in cyberwarfare).
246. See id. (proposing new statutory provisions that would render covert military
actions more transparent and accountable to the public).
247. See e.g., United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 308, 324 (1972)
(rejecting the motion of the United States to vacate a judge’s order to make full disclosure of
monitored telephone conversations and holding that the President’s power to safeguard
national security does not outweigh the Fourth Amendment protections for private telephone
conversations); see also Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) (rejecting a
constitutional challenge to warrantless collection of private telephone conversations
pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act because
plaintiffs could not provide sufficient evidence to show that they had been subject to
surveillance).
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protections guaranteed by the Third Amendment—imagine the Department
of Justice responding to a quartering claim by arguing that they can neither
confirm nor deny whether a member of the U.S. military was quartered in
the plaintiff’s home.
Another symptom and source of this transparency problem is the growth
in classification without adequate oversight.248 Experts have put forth
proposals to address this problem by implementing classification audits,
improving training materials, and changing the incentives by reducing
default classification.249 These proposals along with efforts to implement
the 2010 Reducing Over-Classification Act250 should provide a step in the
right direction,251 but that cannot be the end of the process.
In the cybersecurity context, transparency at both ends will serve to
ensure the type of “national dialogue” that the White House promoted in
2009.252 Accountability for military overreach through attribution would
be exactly the relief “necessary to effectuate”253 the underlying policy of
the Third Amendment.254 It would ensure that any intrusions are either
conducted through a legal framework that was approved and understood by
the public (through Congress), or identified and remedied after the fact.
The alternative is a system where overextended military operations are only
brought to light by selective leaks, which are then subject to intense
scrutiny by federal law enforcement.255 In that system, military decisions
248. See ELIZABETH GOITEIN & DAVID M. SHAPIRO, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
REDUCING OVERCLASSIFICATION THROUGH ACCOUNTABILITY 4–11 (2011), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Justice/LNS/Brennan_Overclassifica
tion_Final.pdf (outlining the history and costs of overclassification). The DoD recently
issued a memo related to the Inspector General’s evaluation of the overclassification
problem, but even that memo was marked “For Official Use Only.” Mike Masnick, Defense
Department Overclassifies Memo on Avoiding Overclassification, TECHDIRT (Dec. 4, 2012,
11:58 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20121126/01
371621143/defense-department-overclassifies-memo-avoiding-overclassification.shtml.
249. See GOITEIN & SHAPIRO, supra note 248, at 33–50 (describing a six-part proposal to
reduce overclassification by implementing new and more efficient systems for processing
potentially classified material).
250. Pub. L. No. 111-258, 124 Stat. 2648 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 6
U.S.C. and 50 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 2011)).
251. See, e.g., Steven Aftergood, Pentagon Classification General to Probe
Overclassification,
SECRECY
NEWS
(Nov.
5,
2012),
http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/2012/11/dodig_overclass.
252. CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW, supra note 220.
253. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
402 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
254. See John C. Dehn, The “Costs” of Accountability in War, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 16,
2011, 1:01 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/08/16/the-costs-of-accountability-in-war
(discussing the importance of accountability during war to “preserv[e] the rights of citizens
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WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security
/fbi-is-increasing-pressure-on-suspects-in-stuxnet-inquiry/2013/01/26/f475095e-6733
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trump civil rights,256 which is clearly the opposite of what those who
drafted the Third Amendment intended.
CONCLUSION
Although the Third Amendment is commonly forgotten, it is not gone,
and the principles that underlie its protections should guide our military
decisions impacting property and privacy.
The recent focus on
cybersecurity in particular would benefit from Third Amendment insights.
Digital devices are modern-day equivalents of “castles” that deserve the
strongest protections from outside intrusion.
Military cyberoperations threaten to intrude upon civilian networks and
devices more frequently and easily than troops during traditional physical
warfare. As a result, we must increase accountability and transparency to
ensure that civil liberties are not compromised. The legislature and private
sector must be involved in the standards-setting and decision-making
processes to maintain the balance between civilian and military power that
the Third Amendment embodies. The President’s Executive Order on
cybersecurity is a step in the right direction, but so far Congress has not
provided adequate guidance or legal balance to executive power in this
area.
There need to be clear rules about what the President can and cannot
authorize in cyberoperations, and systems put in place to account for the
inevitable mistakes that will be made.

with disclosures to the press of classified information about the Stuxnet cyberoperation).
256. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (listing law journal articles that discuss
the lack of consideration of civil liberties in conducting military cyberoperations and noting
the dearth of conversation about civil rights in this area).

